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Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in
Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts To
Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in
Thailand
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 26, 1991, Carla Hills, the United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR"), cited India, the People's Republic of China,
and Thailand for their failure to respect U.S. intellectual property'
as required under "Special 301. ,,2 These countries were, therefore,
potentially subject to trade sanctions.3 This was the first designa-
tion of "priority foreign countries '' 4 under Special 301, and may
have resulted from pressure both from Congress and trade associa-
tions. The potential for increased profits to U.S. businesses has
motivated attempts to protect U.S. intellectual property rights.
When foreign countries use U.S. intellectual property without com-
pensating U.S. owners, the United States may either lose sales or
be deprived of royalties at a time when increased foreign trade is
vital to the U.S. economy. 5 In addition, there is a widespread be-
lief that uniform enforcement of intellectual property rights would
benefit the United States because such enforcement can stimulate
economic development in under-developed countries.6
This Comment explores concepts of intellectual property held
by the Western industrial nations as typified by the United States.
These concepts have led to the recent efforts by the United States
to enforce international recognition of and respect for U.S. intel-
lectual property rights to improve its position in the area of world
trade. This Comment notes the general opposition of the Third
World countries to the Western positions on intellectual property.
1. For a discussion of intellectual property as it applies to this Comment, see infra
notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
2. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 1301, 1303, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter 1988 Trade Bill]. See also infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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The recent attempt to force Thailand to adopt patent protection for
pharmaceuticals demonstrates many of the problems encountered
by the United States in its efforts to enhance intellectual property
protection. This Comment will consider the possible costs and ben-
efits of patent protection for a developing country like Thailand.
The Comment will argue that the policies justifying the protection
of patents in developed countries are not necessarily applicable to
developing countries. The level of economic development of a
country may determine the type (if any) of intellectual property
protection that is profitable for a country to grant. In this light,
several alternatives will be suggested that would allow the United
States to attain its goals of increased foreign trade and enhanced
worldwide intellectual property protection without impeding the
economic development of countries like Thailand.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. What Is Intellectual Property?
Intellectual property is intangible property that is a product of
human creativity, such as books, films, or inventions. At one time,
legal protection was afforded only to tangible products of manual
labor. More recently, legal protection for intangible products of
mental labor has developed. Intellectual property has real eco-
nomic value and may be sold directly as a product, as in the case of
an invention, or may be used to enhance the quality or reduce the
price of a product that is currently on the open market. In the
context of international trade, intellectual property normally is
thought to encompass trade secrets, trademarks, copyrights, and
patents. 7
7. For a general discussion of intellectual property in the international setting, see
Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1323-28 (1990). See also STE-
PHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS, NATIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION §§ 247-48, 320-22 (1975) [hereinafter PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND RELATED RIGHTS]; Thomas J. Field, Jr., Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property:
Meeting Needs Throughout the World, 31 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 3 (1990).
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A patent8 represents a government grant of a "monopoly" 9 of
limited duration'0 on the use of an invention or discovery.
Although patent laws vary from country to country, if an invention
is novel, useful, and not obvious, and if the invention fits within the
statutory categories of protectable inventions, it is generally pat-
entable.11 Much of the controversy in international patent law
surrounds variations, from country to country, in patentable cate-
gories. Because the owner of a patent can charge a royalty for the
use of the patented invention, if a country refuses to recognize a
patentable category, such a refusal will necessarily affect the cost of
using a given technology in that country.
B. Western Position on Patent Protection Versus the Position of
Developing Nations
Western countries generally believe that a patent system pro-
vides the best overall incentive to encourage invention. 12 Although
this assertion is difficult to prove,' 3 it forms the basis for the exten-
8. For a general explanation of patent law, see ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H.
DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1990).
9. Strictly speaking, a patent is not always a monopoly. Many countries grant a right
to exclude others from using an invention. "Every patent shall contain.., a grant... of
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). A true monopoly would grant the exclusive right
to use an invention. In many cases, however, the right to exclude is tantamount to a
monopoly.
10. The term of a patent is usually 15 to 20 years. The period in the United States is
17 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
11. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof."
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
12. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Develop-
ment: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DurKE L.J. 831, 837-38. Inventors benefit from grants of a
temporary monopoly on an invention. Society benefits immediately through the economic
stimulation caused by the use of the invention and through the public disclosure of the
working of the invention. After the patent lapses, the invention is in the public domain.
Even before the lapse of the patent, the knowledge provided by the disclosure stimulates
additional invention by members of the public. There are two ways of viewing the relation-
ship between the public and the inventor. Some commentators consider a patent as a con-
tract where the monopoly is given to the inventor and, in return, the inventor gives the
invention to the public. Another view is that a patent is simply a direct reward for an
invention. See generally MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 8.
13. See generally MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 8. Many experts agree, however, that
where the cost of invention is extremely high as with most pharmaceutical inventions, con-
tinued innovation requires a patent system. See Field, supra note 7, at 3-4. This Comment
assumes that a patent system is the best incentive for invention. The real issue, then, be-
comes whether the benefits of such a system are outweighed by the costs.
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sive patent systems in Western industrialized countries ("WICs"),' 4
including the United States. This implicitly assumes that all econo-
mies necessarily benefit from an increased number of inventions.'
5
When an invention is granted patent protection, investors are more
willing to invest because profits are higher if competition is re-
duced.' 6 WICs also believe that patents encourage the develop-
ment or transfer of the technology necessary to utilize the patent. 17
Thus, according to the Western view, a system of patent laws can
lead to economic development despite the cost of the royalties.
While the U.S. Government and businesses subscribe to the
views of the majority of other WICs and contend that all countries
would benefit from granting and enforcing patents on
pharmaceuticals, 8 many countries, including most Third World na-
tions, do not grant patents for inventions in agriculture and
medicine.' 9 As discussed below,20 these countries may fear drastic
price increases that would result from paying royalties on patented
pharmaceutical and agricultural technology as well as a loss of con-
trol over technology that is vital to national development. The
Thai Patent Act, before its recent revisions, served as a typical ex-
ample of the limitations developing countries place on their patent
laws.
14. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 837-38.
15. The developed economies of WICs are "invention-bound." They require inven-
tion to stimulate continued economic growth. Consider the economic impact of such tech-
nological advances as VCRs, faxes, and cellular telephones. A developing economy may
still be trying to implement "old" technology and would be ill-advised to pay the premium
prices of "new" or patented technology. Id.
16. Id. at 848.
17. Id.
18. See generally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies:
The Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TEcH. 307 (1987); see also
Field, supra note 7.
19. For example, Norway prohibits the patenting of pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs;
India refuses patents for agricultural and horticultural inventions as well as for food and
medicine; China will not grant patents for medical diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, foods,
beverages, plants, or animals. See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD N-40, 1-6, C-20
(Alan J. Jacob ed., 4th ed. 1991). The recent agreement between the United States and
China should lead to changes in the Chinese patent laws. See Jim Mann, U.S. and China
Avert Trade War over Copyrights, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at D1.
20. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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C. Thailand's Patent Act
The Thai Patent Act ("Act"), 21 originally passed in 1979, is the
primary source of patent protection in Thailand. On February 27,
1992, the Thai Legislative Assembly passed a revision of the Act.22
The revision was intended to satisfy U.S. objections to the 1979
Act.2
3
The United States objected to several provisions of the Act as
originally ratified. The strongest complaint of U.S. patent owners
was that the 1979 Act excluded pharmaceutical, agricultural, and
biological products from patent protection, thereby causing a sig-
nificant loss of revenue. 24 U.S. owners also complained that fifteen
years was an insufficient term for patent protection.25 Finally, the
1979 Act provided that a patent must be worked26 in Thailand;
otherwise, the patent would be subject to either a compulsory li-
cense27 or revocation. 28 Such licensing requirements are an ac-
21. Thailand, the Patent Act B.E. 2522 A.D. 1979, reprinted in 82 PAT. & TRADE-
MARK REV. 278-86, 328-38, 371-79 (1984) [hereinafter Thai Patent Act].
22. Peter Ungphakorn, Thais Pass Bill After American Patent Demands, FIN. TiMEs,
Feb. 28, 1992, World Trade News, at 3.
23. For a discussion of the revision to the Thai Patent Act, see infra notes 170-92.
24. See Thai Patent Act, supra note 21, § 9. "Inventions of the following kinds are not
patentable:
(1) foods, beverages, medicines, or medical ingredients;
(2) machinery used directly for agriculture;
(3) animals, plants or biological processes for the production of animals or plants
.... " Id. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association petitioned for a Special 301
action against Thailand due to Thailand's failure to grant patents on pharmaceuticals. See
infra note 144 and accompanying text.
25. See Thai Patent Act, supra note 21, § 35. "An invention patent shall be effective
for a period of fifteen years from the date of the patent application." Id.
26. The act of "working" a patent is a term of art in patent law that means to utilize or
exploit a patent. In the context of pharmaceutical patents, it means using the patented
technology to manufacture the drug within the country that grants the patent. See PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RioHTs, supra note 7, at 425-27.
27. See Thai Patent Act, supra note 21, § 46.
After the expiration of a period of three years from the issue of a patent, other
persons may apply to use the rights under that patent ... if it is apparent that... :
(1) there is no manufacturing or production of the product.., or no use of
the product.., under the patent, within the Kingdom, for no appropriate reason;
or
(2) there is no sale of the product.., or the product is being sold at unrea-
sonably high prices or... not being adequately supplied to meet public demand
•.. for no justifiable reason.
Id.
28. See Thai Patent Act, supra note 21, § 55.
After the expiration of a period of six years from the date of issuance of a patent,
the Director-General may request ... an order revoking the patent if... :
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cepted part of international intellectual property law, and similar
licensing and revocation provisions are common in patent laws of
many countries. 29 Furthermore, the U.S. complaints seem to con-
tradict assertions that granting a patent will bring an influx of for-
eign investments to work the patent.30 If patent protection
automatically leads to foreign investment and development, patent
owners should not fear compulsory license laws because these
would seldom, if ever, be invoked.
III. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Consequences for Industrialized Nations
Any patent system will have costs as well as benefits. The in-
dustrialized countries all have comprehensive patent systems.
Whatever the economic costs of operating these systems, the indus-
trialized economies successfully absorb these costs. A source of
concern to the industrialized nations, and in particular to the
United States, is the loss of revenues caused by misappropriation
of intellectual property. Within its borders, a country is able to
enforce its intellectual property laws, but international enforce-
ment of these essentially domestic laws has proven to be problem-
atic at best. The relation between intellectual property and foreign
trade has been especially significant.
Foreign trade accounts for almost twenty percent of U.S. eco-
nomic activity.31 Between 1980 and 1987, the U.S. trade deficit in-
creased from $31 billion to $170 billion.32 Massive borrowings
from foreign creditors financed much of this deficit. As a result,
the United States has become the world's largest debtor nation.33
(1) there is... no use ... within the Kingdom, without justifiable reason; or
(2) there is no sale of the products ... or such products are being sold at an
exorbitant price, or are not sold in sufficient supply to meet the public demand
within the Kingdom, without justifiable reason.
Id.
29. Over 100 countries require the working of a patent, and 50 countries have com-
pulsory licensing provisions. See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, supra note 19, app.
A-21 to A-26.
30. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
31. Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1989).
32. Id.
33. Office of Technology Assessment, Paying the Bill: Manufacturers and the U.S.
Trade Deficit, OTA-ITE-390, at 1-8 (June 1988).
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The annual interest payment on the U.S. debt during the 1990s has
been estimated at approximately $100 billion.34 Enforcing intellec-
tual property rights in foreign countries can reduce the trade deficit
by increasing competitiveness of domestic products overseas in two
ways: (1) by increasing the price of foreign goods to cover royalties
foreign manufacturers must pay; and (2) by decreasing the quality
of foreign goods by denying foreign manufacturers access to pro-
tected U.S. technology. Royalties paid for use of U.S. intellectual
property directly decrease the trade deficit.
Government and business groups have estimated that the fail-
ure of foreign countries to respect U.S. intellectual property rights
has resulted in large losses to U.S. business. The United States In-
ternational Trade Commission ("ITC") estimated that "piracy" 35 of
intellectual property resulted in losses of between $43 and $61 bil-
lion in 1986 alone.36 A study by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association reported that, in 1984, unauthorized sales of patented
U.S. pharmaceuticals by local firms in just five foreign countries
amounted to $192 million, while the concomitant sales by U.S.
firms were only $162 million.37
The reported losses are particularly significant when viewed in
light of the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit. Some commentators
have noted, however, that the actual losses may not be as large as
preliminary numbers suggest.38 In many instances, the estimates
are based on data voluntarily submitted by industries that would
benefit from a protectionist trade policy. These businesses may ex-
aggerate their losses to persuade Congress to increase trade barri-
34. This estimate assumes that the U.S. debt is not brought into balance until the year
2000. Lester C. Thurow & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, The Economic Black Hole, 67 FoREIGN
POL'Y 5 (1987). Each $40 billion in annual interest payments could result in about a one
percent drop in the U.S. standard of living. Id. The authors observe that the worst case
scenario could result in a seven percent fall in living standard, which would be three times
greater than the largest post-war U.S. recession, that of 1981-82. Id. at 7.
35. Misappropriation of intellectual property is often referred to as piracy, with the
misappropriators being called pirates. The origin of this pejorative term is not clear, as
motion pictures or drugs without license do not seem to have much in common with buc-
caneers. Nevertheless, the terms are widely used in discussions of intellectual property.
For a discussion of intellectual property piracy, see Emmert, supra note 7, at 1319-22.
36. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its Requirements, Implemen-
tation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 260 (1989-90).
37. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 309 n.6. The author argues that U.S. corpora-
tions would have had an additional $192 million in sales but for the piracy. See also Em-
mert, supra note 7, at 1320.
38. Emmert, supra note 7, at 1323-28.
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ers.39 A detailed study of seven countries4° responsible for the
most serious piracies of U.S. intellectual property rights found that
the 1986 losses to U.S. intellectual property owners total approxi-
mately $3.4 billion.41 These studies indicate that the actual U.S.
losses from intellectual property piracy do not exceed $10 billion
per year.42 Thus, the benefits from enforcing U.S. intellectual
property rights are probably smaller than originally perceived.
This, however, does not reduce the costs of such enforcement to
foreign countries. 43
B. Consequences for Developing Countries
The costs and benefits of a patent system can be different for a
developing country than they are for an industrialized country. A
primary economic goal for many developing nations is to increase
the standard of living of their people by encouraging Western-style
economic development, often through the use of Western technol-
ogy.44 Thus, the mechanics and costs of technology transfer have
caused much friction between WICs and developing countries. 45 If
a developing country grants legal recognition to foreign patents, it
would have no legal way to use patented technology without pay-
ing royalties to the patent owner.4" If the economy of the country
is weak, there may be insufficient foreign currency reserves to pay
the royalties and provide essential services. Thus, there can be
39. Id.
40. The seven countries were Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan. Id. at 1328.
41. Id. This figure was obtained by totaling the estimates provided in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHrS: GLOBAL CONSENSus, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 386-407 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
42. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1323-28.
43. For a discussion of costs to foreign countries, see infra notes 75-85 and accompa-
nying text.
44. Thus, many developing countries view protection and use of intellectual property
as a question of economic policy. These countries wish to obtain new technology at the
lowest short-term price. On the other hand, WICs are more likely to view intellectual
property ownership as a fundamental right, which makes piracy seem unfair or morally
repugnant. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTs: GLOBAL CONsENsus, GLOBAL CON-
FLICr?, supra note 41, at 1-3.
45. A number of methods to resolve difficulties and disputes in technology transfer
have been described. One example is the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") Model Law on Inventions for Developing Countries. For a discussion of the
WIPO Model Law, see Oddi, supra note 12, at 870-73. For related material, see Emmert,
supra note 7, at 1382-83.
46. See, e.g., Field, supra note 7, at 5-7.
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great pressure for the country to appropriate the patent or to con-
done the pirating of the patent by its citizens.
Because nations consider control over food supply and health-
care to be an aspect of national sovereignty, 47 there is a particularly
heavy pressure to appropriate inventions in agriculture and
medicine.48 Piracy49 can circumvent the payment of royalties and
thus promote development by making valuable technologies avail-
able at a minimum cost. This inexpensive use of technology stimu-
lates the local economy and provides additional profits from
exporting products of these technologies to other nations that do
not recognize the foreign patent.50
Various reasons exist for developing countries to grant patent
protection to foreign inventions such as pharmaceuticals. If devel-
oping countries recognize foreign patent rights for pharmaceuti-
cals, they could, according to the predictions of the supporters of
intellectual property protection,5 1 obtain a number of potential
benefits: (1) foreign companies would increase their investment in
production and research and development ("R&D") of high tech-
nology pharmaceuticals within the developing countries;5 2 (2) for-
eign companies would increase the transfer of pharmaceutical
technology to the developing countries;5 3 (3) foreign companies
would make a variety of important new drugs available to the peo-
ple of the developing countries;5 4 and (4) domestic R&D of
pharmaceuticals would be stimulated.55
47. For a discussion of intellectual property protection and national sovereignty, see
Emmert, supra note 7, at 1355-58, 1383-84.
48. The economies of many developing countries are largely agricultural. The govern-
ment may consider it a threat to the nation's sovereignty as well as its economic existence
to allow patents to restrict agriculture or healthcare. See id.
49. If a country has not granted patent protection to the invention in question, this
should not be regarded as piracy. Patent laws are local in character. Thus, if a country has
chosen not to grant patent protection, the invention is in that country's public domain and
may be used freely by all. For a discussion of international variations in pharmaceutical
patent protection, see generally Mossinghoff, supra note 18.
50. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 874-75.
51. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RiGrrs: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CoNFLIcr?, supra note 41, at 87-108.
52. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1370-71.
53. Id. See also Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 310, 314.
54. One reason for the recent strengthening of pharmaceutical patent laws by the
Government of South Korea is its desire to make more new drugs available to its popula-
tion. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 317.
55. Another reason for South Korea's decision to recognize pharmaceutical patents is
the desire to stimulate domestic R&D. See id. at 316-18.
19941 577
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The promise by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry to increase
investment in local R&D and production facilities is one of the
most persuasive arguments for Thailand to grant pharmaceutical
patents. This promise, however, may be illusory. The Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association has complained that countries
such as Thailand that condone the piracy of pharmaceutical patents
are siphoning off profits from the U.S. drug industry.5 6 If Thailand
were to prevent the manufacture and sale of pirated drugs, the
quickest way for U.S. companies to realize profits would be to ship
U.S.-made products to Thailand. There would be no need to con-
struct new facilities in Thailand.5 7 Even if the manufacturing ca-
pacity of the United States were saturated, there is no guarantee
that new plants would be built in Thailand. It is also unlikely that
Thailand would receive much R&D funding from the United
States, because Thailand lacks trained technicians and other infra-
structure necessary for commercial pharmaceutical research.5 8
Pharmaceutical patents would probably be worked in Thailand
only because the Thailand Patent Act contains compulsory licens-
ing provisions. 59 U.S. patent owners, however, have deemed such
licensing provisions to be unacceptable.6° Because the United
States has secured many of the changes it requested to the Act,61
U.S. drug companies may have little incentive to manufacture in
Thailand.
The promise to transfer new technology may also be illusory.
If U.S. companies manufacture only few drugs in Thailand, little
pharmaceutical technology will have to be transferred to Thailand.
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association has complained
56. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
57. Pharmaceuticals are small, high-value items that do not usually contain a signifi-
cant component of unskilled labor. Thus, manufacturing in a developing country would
present no particular advantages. Furthermore, there is little advantage to local manufac-
turing to avoid freight costs because drugs are light in weight and can be shipped inexpen-
sively. See generally Mossinghoff, supra note 18.
58. See How Companies Can Ease Thai Infrastructure Woes, Bus. ASIA, Nov. 28,
1988, at 382; Thailand's Staffing Scene: The Worst Lies Ahead, Bus. ASIA, Apr. 16, 1990, at
130.
59. For the text of Thai Patent Act § 46, see supra note 27. The 1992 revisions of the
Act changed this provision, but compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals is still likely. See
infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
60. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 312. It is probably unreasonable for the United
states to object to this type of provision, as they are common even among the WICs. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
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that Thai companies manufacture and import drugs in violation of
U.S. patents. 62 As long as Thai companies already manufacture
these drugs, technology transfer from the United States is unneces-
sary because Thailand must already have the necessary technology.
As for drugs that Thailand imports from other pirating countries,
these violating countries can probably provide the technology
more cheaply than can the United States.63 In addition, special ef-
forts at technology transfer would be unnecessary because the pat-
ent should already disclose all the necessary technology.
64
Moreover, granting pharmaceutical patents will not necessar-
ily guarantee the availability of important new drugs. Those
new drugs that can be manufactured conventionally are already
available from pirate manufacturers either in Thailand or in other
countries that do not respect U.S. pharmaceutical patents. 65
Pharmaceuticals that require complex manufacturing techniques
are usually not available from pirate sources because the special
manufacturing technology is not available outside of WICs. These
drugs are unusually expensive because of high R&D and manufac-
turing costs. 66 The low average wages 67 in Thailand would seem to
limit the market for such drugs because their price is beyond the
62. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
63. The complex technology necessary to produce certain high technology
pharmaceuticals may be an exception.
64. When a patent is issued in the United States, it contains a disclosure that should
enable one skilled in the art to practice the patent. The issued patent is designed to make
publicly available all the information needed to manufacture the pharmaceutical in ques-
tion. This public disclosure of the invention is one of the justifications for patent monop-
oly. One author has discussed the problem, however, that patent documents are often
inadequate to allow industrially unsophisticated countries to practice the invention. The
idea that granting patents will induce the owner of the technology to transfer the technol-
ogy necessary to work the patent is flawed because, if the patent document does not dis-
close the necessary technology, the patent would be invalid for lack of an enabling
disclosure. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 850-51. Thus, Thailand would gain little in the way
of disclosure by issuing pharmaceutical patents. If the U.S. patent does not contain ade-
quate disclosure, it should be invalid under U.S. patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
65. See generally Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 308-11 (discussing the widespread
availability of copied pharmaceuticals).
66. For example, one of these drugs, TPA (Tissue Plasminogen Activator), is manu-
factured by genetic engineering and costs $2,200 per patient, while a similar drug, strepto-
kinase, which is extracted from a fungus, costs $200 per patient. The cost differential is due
to differences in development and manufacturing costs. Elizabeth Neus, Clot-Busting
Drug Falls to Studies, Economic Pressures, GANNErr NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 3, 1991.
67. The average daily wage in Thailand is under $3.00. See Into Bo Champon, The
Next "Little Tiger": Manufacturing and Intellectual Property Rights in Thailand, 3 TRANS-
NAT'L LAW. 275, 278 (1990).
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means of the average consumer. It is technology, not patent law,
that keeps these drugs from being copied. Therefore, U.S. pharma-
ceutical companies will probably not refuse to sell these drugs to
the small number of Thais who can afford them.68 Thus, granting
pharmaceutical patents may not actually result in increased availa-
bility of new drugs. It is possible, however, that granting pharma-
ceutical patents would increase the quality of the available drugs.
The extensive regulations that ensure the high quality of U.S.
pharmaceuticals do not control manufacturers of counterfeit drugs.
Unfortunately, little direct data is available on the quality of pi-
rated pharmaceuticals.
69
Because private corporations are not likely to undertake ex-
pensive and risky pharmaceutical research without patent protec-
tion for the pharmaceuticals, 70 there is little private pharmaceutical
research in Thailand. 71 If there are private resources available in
Thailand to undertake pharmaceutical research, a new patent pol-
icy would encourage such research by granting monopoly protec-
tion to new drugs that might result from the research.
Nonetheless, the relative poverty of most Thai consumers
72
limits the market for expensive new drugs. The small Thai market
may inhibit private pharmaceutical research as much as the lack of
patent protection. Furthermore, the Thai Government's unwilling-
68. There is no indication that pharmaceutical companies have interdicted all drug
shipments to Thailand as retaliation for the ineffective Thai patent law. "The invention is
likely to be supplied by the foreign patent owner itself, who is unlikely to refuse to import
the invention merely because of the absence of patent protection in the developing country
of import, provided a profit can be made by selling the invention there." Oddi, supra note
12, at 848-49.
69. Argentina refuses to respect U.S. pharmaceutical patents. SmithKline, the manu-
facturer of the well-known anti-ulcer drug Tagamet, estimates that they lost $50 million to
the pirate version of the drug. It seems likely that the copied drug was almost as effica-
cious as the original; otherwise, patients and their physicians probably would have switched
to the original. See id. at 845-46.
70. Id. at 839 n.37. See also Field, supra note 7, at 3-4.
71. There is, however, medical research under the auspices of various government
programs. Like many developing countries, Thailand focuses its limited research funds on
specific disease targets. Malaria, pediatric respiratory viral infections, and AIDS are
among the targeted diseases. The non-profit research programs are generally operated
through the country's university system. Funds come from local as well as international
sources such as the United States Aid for International Development ("U.S.A.I.D."). For
a brief discussion of some of these projects, see Thailand Launches Technology Commer-
cialization Program with the U.S., GENETIc ENGINEERING NEWS, Jan. 1992, at 13. For a
discussion of health problems in Thailand and the growing menace of AIDS, see also THAI-
LAND, A CouNtRY STUDY 113-15 (Barbara L. LePoer ed., 6th ed. 1989).
72. See supra note 67.
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ness to grant pharmaceutical patent protection may represent a
policy decision to supplant private pharmaceutical research to
avoid diverting limited private research funds from more important
projects. 73 In general, Thailand is not hostile to patent protection.
This is evidenced by its grant of patent protection to most other
types of inventions.
74
In addition to their potential benefits, patent systems also
have attendant costs, such as the expenses of the patent system bu-
reaucracy, 75 price increases in patented products that would have
been invented without the patent system, 76 and inefficient alloca-
tion of research funds by patent-seeking corporations. 77 The deci-
sion to grant patent protection for any or all classes of invention
should be based on the balancing of the cost and benefit factors. In
the case of pharmaceutical drugs in Thailand, the most significant
cost of granting patents would be the increased prices of drugs that
are already available in a pirated form. Because price increases are
usually justified as a cost that is balanced by the benefit of having
the new invention,78 pirated drugs already in existence cannot be
counted as a benefit generated by the patent system. Additional
costs in Thailand would include loss of jobs and other economic
benefits from local manufacture of pirated drugs.79 A closely re-
73. For a complete discussion of poverty and development strategies in Thailand, see
ROBERT J. MUSCAT, THAILAND AND THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND
FOREIGN AID 185-234 (1990).
74. See Thai Patent Act, supra note 21.
75. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 840.
76. Because royalties are paid to the patent owners, any patented product is necessar-
ily more expensive than an unpatented product. If the patented product is one that would
not have been invented without the incentive of the patent system, the overall benefit to
the economy should outweigh the increased costs. Many inventions, however, would be
made without a patent incentive. When a patent system is available, these inventions often
receive patents. In that case, the economy pays a premium price even though the patent
incentive was not responsible for the invention. See id.
77. Research expenditures by patent-seeking corporations can exhibit two inefficien-
cies that can be of special concern to developing countries. First, if one corporation has a
key patent in a particular area of technology, other companies are often loath to spend
research money in that area because they can no longer obtain the key patent. If the
technological area in question is vital to the developing country, the patent system can
actually discourage essential research. Second, companies often expend considerable re-
search efforts in foreclosing an area to their competitors and extending the life of existing
patents by making minor improvements to existing inventions. These actions may run
counter to the needs of a developing economy. Id. at 840-41.
78. Id. at 845-46.
79. This assumes that U.S. firms will not establish Thai manufacturing facilities. Ex-
port of pirated inventions provides an additional source of profits. Id. at 875.
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lated cost is the loss of profits from selling copied pharmaceuticals
to other countries that do not respect U.S. patent rights.80
There are also political costs associated with imposing phar-
maceutical patents. As discussed below, current U.S. policy favors
the use of trade retaliation to encourage foreign countries to re-
spect U.S. intellectual property.81 The Thai Government may re-
sist attempts by the United States to force it to alter its internal
policies because acquiescence would demonstrate lack of power
and national status. Thailand is unique among Southeast-Asian
countries in that it has never fallen under the colonial domination
of any European country.s2 The Kingdom of Siam (predecessor to
the present state of Thailand) avoided becoming a European col-
ony by playing off French colonial aspirations in Vietnam against
British aspirations in Burma and Malaysia.8 3 The Thais find it es-
pecially distasteful to have a Western nation coerce them into mak-
ing internal policy changes.84 Acquiescing in foreign demands,
particularly those concerning matters of healthcare, may be politi-
cally untenable for the Thai Government.8 5
IV. THE PREsENT CoNFLIcT
A. International Intellectual Property
Although the United States and other WICs strongly favor
worldwide enforcement of intellectual property rights, much of the
Third World opposes such enforcement.86 The U.S. position of
strengthening international intellectual property enforcement is
backed by at least two motives: (1) the economic benefits to the
United States which enhanced enforcement of intellectual property
80. Id. at 874-75.
81. See infra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
82. See Z. MICHAEL SZAZ, SOUTHEAST AsIA 61 (1983).
83. See THAILAND, A COUTRrY STUDY, supra note 71, at 22-25.
84. See Thomas N. O'Neill III, Intellectual Property Protection in Thailand: Asia's
Young Tiger and America's "Growing" Concern, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 603, 621 (1990).
85. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai was. strongly criticized by his constituents because
he seemed more interested in dealing with the U.S. intellectual property problem than with
the extensive damage caused by Typhoon Gay. "Any serious attempt by officials to negoti-
ate a way to deal with intellectual property piracy is politically untenable. Just introducing
the legislation for minor concessions ... is impossible for the moment." Typhoon Gay
Fallout Threatens IPP Progress, Bus. AsIA, Jan. 8, 1990, at 18. For a discussion of opposi-
tion to the 1992 revision to the Thai Patent Act, see also infra notes 161-69.
86. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1354-79.
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could yield;8 7 and (2) a belief that improved protection of intellec-
tual property is essential for the economic development of all
countries. 8 Many developing countries adopt Western-style intel-
lectual property systems despite lack of proof that such systems
will benefit them.8 9 Some Third World countries, however, view
WICs' attempts to enforce intellectual property as a continuation
of colonialist policies in which WICs control the economic future
of the lesser-developed nations by allocating technology and ex-
tracting exorbitant royalties in return.90 In addition, many devel-
oping countries believe that WICs have an obligation to aid the
development of poorer countries rather than retarding their
growth through restrictive intellectual property policies.91
There is a dual nature to the United States' handling of inter-
national intellectual property. On one hand, the United States
views intellectual property as a legal issue. The United States is a
member of several international treaty organizations and conven-
tions that have been seeking, for over a century, 92 to create a uni-
form international intellectual property law. On the other hand,
the United States also treats intellectual property as a trade issue.93
During the last forty years, the United States has generally re-
87. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
88. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 848-55; Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 310-11.
89. Oddi, supra note 12, at 835-36.
90. Id. at 877-78.
91. Emmert, supra note 7, at 1354.
92. The first international patent congress was held in Vienna in 1873. See Emmert,
supra note 7, at 1337-39. The original intention was to create uniform, worldwide intellec-
tual property laws. Significant differences in the intellectual property laws of the attending
countries made this goal unattainable, however. The goal of the participants became
somewhat simpler: all foreigners should receive the same treatment under a host country's
intellectual property laws as would nationals of that host country. Id. at 1337-38. Accord-
ing to the principle of national treatment, each member state agrees to grant citizens of
other member states the same treatment concerning intellectual property laws and proce-
dures as it does to its own citizens. Thus, if a country allows its citizens to obtain patents
for a certain category of inventions, that country must also allow foreigners to obtain the
same type of patent. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 856-57. This principle controlled the 1883
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Work, revised July 10, 1974, reprinted in 7 COPYRIGwr 135 (1971). See Emmert,
supra note 7, at 1338 n.75.
93. See generally Kenneth J. Ashman, Comment, The Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988--The Section 301 Amendments: Insignificant Changes from Prior
Law?, 7 B.U. Irr'L L.J. 115, 129-31 (1989).
1994] 583
584 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 16:569
solved trade issues in a multilateral context that seeks to attain
consensus between trading partners.94
Since the end of World War II, the continued development of
international intellectual property law has proceeded under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO"), now a United Nations agency.95 WIPO's lack of pro-
gress in protecting intellectual property has frustrated the United
States.96 Not only do the WIPO principles grant considerable dis-
cretion97 to the member countries, there are few remedies pre-
scribed for what limited protection is available. 98 In addition, the
United States and other WICs have complained that opposing vot-
ing blocs prevent attempts to strengthen WIPO conventions.99 Be-
cause the United States' position on intellectual property
94. Baucus, supra note 31, at 3-5.
95. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, opened for
signature July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
96. Emmert, supra note 7, at 1339-44. The United States is dissatisfied with WIPO
because the central principle of national treatment leaves too much discretion in the hands
of offending countries and because the limited membership makes enforcement difficult.
Id. Because national treatment mandates only that a country give foreigners the same
rights as its own citizens, this principle allows a country the discretion to provide no protec-
tion for a given category of intellectual property. At least 46 countries refuse to provide
patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Oddi, supra note 12, at 867. For a complete de-
scription of these countries' patent procedures, see generally PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD, supra note 19. Under international conventions, countries are free to deny pro-
tection to pharmaceuticals as long as the countries do not grant their own citizens rights
superior to those granted to foreigners. The United States would like a system that forces
all countries to provide reciprocal intellectual property protection. Under a reciprocal
treatment system, a country would have to give the owner of foreign intellectual property
at least the same rights she would enjoy in her own country. In that situation, the country's
intellectual property laws would essentially be under external control because the country
would have to strengthen its own laws to avoid favoring the foreign intellectual property
owner over its own nationals. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 834-35.
97. See discussion supra notes 92, 96.
98. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1342. Article 28 of the Paris Convention, added in
1987, does provide for dispute resolution in the International Court of Justice at the
Hague. Id. at 1342-43. No patent cases, however, have been initiated under this provision.
Possible reasons for the absence of such suits include: the lack of intellectual property
expertise on the part of the Court; the refusal of many WIPO members to accept the
jurisdiction of the Court, combined with procedures that prevent member countries from
being sued against their will; and the perception that such a proceeding might be consid-
ered an unfriendly act against the defendant state. Id.
99. WICs, including the United States, vote as a bloc. Their vote is usually opposed
by the developing nations and the socialist countries. Because of the large number of de-
veloping nations, the Western position can never achieve a majority. Id. at 1343.
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protection is a minority position worldwide, 1°° the United States
has found it difficult to prevail in the democratic forum of WIPO
and has, therefore, sought solutions through trade agreements.
For the last forty years, the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs ("GAT'I")1° 1 has formed the basis of most U.S. trade poli-
cies.1o2 GATT is an agreement between many nations that sets
rules for international trade. The goal of GATI is to reduce tariffs
and to promote free trade.103 The GAIT forum also negotiates
details of future trade policies.1o4 The United States believes that
GATT will be a more conducive forum for enhancing intellectual
property protection because the GATT system is more flexible and
has not developed the voting blocs that have impeded progress
through WIPO.105
The United States proposed that the latest GATT talks, the
Uruguay Round, should contain a framework for enhanced inter-
national protection of intellectual property.1o6 The U.S. initiative
resulted in the Punta del Este Declaration, 1° which listed intellec-
tual property protection as a major goal of GATT negotiations.10
The new standards were proposed to include four basic elements:
(1) a substantive standard for intellectual property protection; (2)
creation of effective enforcement measures; (3) a mechanism of
multilateral consultation and dispute settlement; and (4) the appli-
100. Only a very small minority of the world's population live in technologically-ad-
vanced industrialized countries like the United States.
101. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 396-432 (2d ed. 1986).
102. Baucus, supra note 31, at 3-4.
103. Id.
104. Emmert, supra note 7, at 1344.
105. Id. at 1345-46.
106. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 290-91 (1989).
107. Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Sept. 1986, at 7, reprinted in A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property
Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23
STAN. J. Ir'L L. 57, 95 (1987) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
108. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 106, at 290.
In order to reduce the distortations [sic] and impediments to international trade,
and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to en-
force intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify GAIT provisions and elaborate as ap-
propriate new rules and disciplines.
Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 107, at 7.
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cation of usual GATT provisions, such as transparency and na-
tional treatment, to intellectual property protection.109
The Uruguay Round has thus far failed to produce such an
agreement. Initial meetings did not produce a consensus, even
among WICs. By 1988, four distinct positions had emerged.110
One author suggests that this impasse could be broken by a com-
promise position that would offer special assistance in the form of
debt exchange and technology transfer for developing nations."'
The creation of a "package deal" that would encompass other
GATT concerns, such as agricultural subsidies, was also pro-
posed.112 On December 20, 1991, Arthur Dunkel, GATT Chief
Negotiator, submitted to the 108 GATT Members a compromise
proposal designed to cover "everything from services and intellec-
tual property rights to agriculture." 1 3 Conclusion of the current
GATT negotiations was set for mid-April 1992; 114 however, no suc-
cessful conclusion to the talks was reached. European and Japa-
nese leaders expressed unhappiness with the farm reform
proposals contained in the GATIT package at the same time that
then-President Bush stressed that the United States would reject
any plan that did not lead to big cuts in farm subsidies.115 Mean-
while, members of the U.S. Congress complained that the Dunkel
proposal is not strong enough in key areas such as intellectual
property, services, and agriculture. Senator Bentsen commented:
"Let me be clear: This text simply is not yet good enough to pass
the Senate." 116 As of early 1993, the prospects for a conclusion to
the GATT talks is distant at best.
109. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 106, at 291.
110. Id. at 292. WICs (United States, the European Community, and Japan) favored
establishing substantive standards. Id. Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, which includes Thailand, were also willing to negotiate substantive standards, as
long as those standards reflected the developmental differences between WICs and the
Third World. Id. Canada and Switzerland favored the adoption of widely-accepted stan-
dards, even if this meant acceptance of lower overall intellectual property standards. Id.
India, Brazil, and several other developing countries, however, questioned the use of
GATT to set intellectual property standards, and demanded that WIPO be allowed to set
all international intellectual property standards. Id.
111. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1379-83.
112. Id. at 1385-91.
113. GATT Pushes Its Trade-Talk Deadline Back, L.A. TiMEs, Jan. 11, 1992, at D5.
114. Id.
115. Many Nations Upset over Proposed GATT Package, L.A. TiMEs, Jan. 14, 1992, at
D3.
116. Sen. Bentsen Says Draft GATT Accord 'Simply Not Good Enough' To Pass Senate,
9 INT'L TRADE REP. 262 (1992).
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A failure to reach an agreement on the GATT Accord will
probably lead to increased calls for tariff barriers and other forms
of trade retaliation. U.S. intellectual property owners consider the
"big stick," 117 country-by-country negotiations for obtaining intel-
lectual property protection, complementary to the GATT ef-
forts. 118 Already, the U.S. business community's concern over
international intellectual property protection has led to the adop-
tion of tougher trade and tariff laws.119 These attempts to enforce
intellectual property protection through unilateral tariffs and
threats of trade retaliation, however, are ineffective with countries
that are not dependent on U.S. trade, and may be of limited appli-
cation because of political and military considerations. 20 Never-
theless, these tactics are used to secure the enforcement of U.S.
intellectual property rights in Thailand.
B. Recent U.S. Policy Towards Countries That Fail To Protect
Intellectual Property
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("1988
Trade Bill") 121 contains a key provision, "Special 301,"122 that is
designed to provide a credible threat of U.S. retaliation against any
trading partners that fail to reform their intellectual property
laws.123 Special 301 requires the USTR, within thirty days of issu-
ing the National Trade Estimate Report, to list those countries that
deny "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights" 24 or deny "fair and equitable market access to United
States persons who rely upon intellectual property protection."'1 25
Under the Special 301 provision, the USTR must name "prior-
ity countries" that (1) have the most egregious policies, (2) have
the greatest economic impact on the United States, and (3) do not
enter into good faith negotiations or make significant progress in
117. This is the unilateral method of threatening trade sanctions or a decrease in for-
eign aid for any countries not granting full protection to U.S. intellectual property rights.
118. John Pearson, The Patent Pirates Are Finally Walking the Plank, Bus. WK., Feb.
17, 1992, at 125.
119. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
120. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 106, at 302-03.
121. 1988 Trade Bill, supra note 2.
122. Id. §§ 1301, 1303.
123. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 259.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
125. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(B) (1988).
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negotiations to improve intellectual property protection. 126 Within
thirty days after identifying priority countries, the USTR must ini-
tiate investigations of those countries' policies. This investigation
must be complete within six months.127 The investigation is in-
tended to lead to bilateral negotiations, but the USTR may retali-
ate by increasing duties or imposing other restrictions on imports if
the offending countries do not improve their intellectual property
policies. 128
The initial report under Special 301, issued on May 25, 1989,129
pointed out that virtually no U.S. trading partner satisfied the stan-
dards being proposed by the United States at the Uruguay
Round. 130 Nevertheless, the USTR believed that progress was be-
ing made, and declined to identify any country as a priority foreign
country under Special 301.131 Instead, the USTR published a prior-
ity watch list of countries, including Thailand, that were particu-
larly deficient in intellectual property protection. 132 In addition,
the USTR published a watch list of seventeen countries guilty of
less severe offenses against U.S. intellectual property rights.133 The
USTR announced action plans for each country on the priority
watch list, and the United States began intensified discussions with
those countries. 34 The USTR threatened remedial action if no fur-
ther progress was made by November 1, 1989.135 The USTR com-
piled lists of specific improvements in intellectual property
protection sought from each of the listed countries. 136 From Thai-
126. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1) (1988). See Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 261.
127. See 1988 Trade Bill, supra note 2, §§ 1301, 1303. The time period can be extended
to nine months if the issues are complex or if substantial progress is being made. ld.
128. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 262.
129. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet "Special 301" on In-
tellectual Property, May 25, 1989, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 718 (May 31, 1989)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
130. Id. at 719.
131. Id.
132. In addition to Thailand, the list included Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea,
Mexico, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Id.
133. This list contained developed as well as developing countries: Argentina, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippine,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 720.
136. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 267-69.
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land, the USTR demanded improved patent protection for all
types of inventions.137
On November 1, 1989, the USTR announced the progress on
the Special 301 actions. Again, the USTR designated no countries
as Special 301 priority countries. The USTR removed three coun-
tries138 from the priority watch list and placed them on the watch
list.139 Although steady improvement in overall intellectual prop-
erty protection was reported, o40 five countries remained on the pri-
ority watch list, while the original seventeen countries, as well as
the three additions, remained on the watch list.141
The USTR listed the first priority countries, India, the
People's Republic of China, and Thailand, in April 1991.142
At the same time, the USTR placed the European Com-
munity, Brazil, and Australia on the priority watch list.143 Because
Thailand was already under two Section 301 investigations,144
the USTR decided not to initiate a new investigation of
Thailand. 45
137. Id. at 269. The demand also included protection for U.S. literary works and
software. Id.
138. The countries were: Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia. Id. at 270.
139. Id.
140. Despite the USTR's statements, it seems that Thailand's progress on copyright
protection was not considered adequate. In early 1989, Thailand was denied a portion of
its benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). See Charles Farns-
worth, US. Curbs Thai Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1989, at B1; Thailand Denied Certain
GSP Benefits for Weak Intellectual Property Laws, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 279 (1989). The GSP grants duty-free access of goods from developing nations to
the more developed. This provision, initiated in 1971 between the Kennedy and Tokyo
GATT Rounds, is considered a waiver of GATT Article I, and more developed countries
are not obligated to grant nor maintain the GSP. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1392-93.
141. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 271.
142. USTR Designates China, India and Thailand Most Egregious Violators Under Spe-
cial 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 643 (1991).
143. Id.
144. See USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigation of Thailand's Pharmaceutical Patent
Law, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 443 (1991). The investigation was initiated in response to a
petition filed on Jan. 20, 1991 by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association. The As-
sociation alleged that Thailand's failure to protect pharmaceutical patents had cost Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers Association members at least $24 million a year. Id. Under
Special 301, the USTR had until March 1992 to complete the investigation. Id. In Decem-
ber 1990, the USTR had initiated Section 301 investigation of Thailand's copyright prac-
tices in response to a petition filed by the International Intellectual Property Alliance. The
petition alleged that U.S. businesses lost between $70 million and $100 million due to Thai
piracy of American movies, music, computer software, books, and other copyrighted
materials. Id.
145. Id.
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All three cited countries made serious responses to the threat
of U.S. retaliation. India, faced with a balance of payment crisis,
sought a new loan from the International Monetary Fund and, as a
result, was more vulnerable to U.S. pressure.146 In October 1991,
the USTR arrived in New Delhi for secret talks on intellectual
property protection, and leftists threatened street protests because
the "negotiations would seek to perpetuate Washington's 'bullying'
of third-world nations." 147 In November 1991, Indian Commerce
Minister, P. Chidambaram, indicated that India was prepared to
make concessions on the pharmaceutical patent issue.148 The con-
cessions may not be adequate, however, because the Commerce
Minister said that U.S. pharmaceutical companies would have to
produce the drugs in India "at affordable prices to the vast major-
ity of people."'1 49
China resisted the demands of the United States at first.
Although negotiations between the United States and China were
completed in a "frank and friendly" atmosphere, China refused to
yield. 150 When China failed to meet the deadline of November 26,
1991, the U.S. Government initiated the process for imposing trade
sanctions.15' China responded by warning that the sanctions might
lead to tariffs on U.S. goods and that it was prepared to engage in a
trade war with the United States. 52 Nevertheless, the threats of a
trade war were not realized, and China soon capitulated to the
United States' demands by agreeing to revise its intellectual prop-
erty laws.153
146. Raju Gopalakrishnan, U.S. Trade Official in India for Patent Talks, REUTERS, Oct.
4, 1991.
147. Id.
148. India Makes Key Concession on Patents, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 1991.
149. Id.
150. George White & David Holley, Limits by Chinese Strain Sino-American Trade,
L.A. Tivms, Oct. 28, 1991, at D3.
151. Jim Mann, U.S. To Impose Major Trade Sanctions on China, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1991, at D2. See also U.S. Takes First Steps on Sanctions Against Chinese Goods Under
Special 301, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1754 (1991).
152. David Holley, China Warns of Trade War With U.S. over Patents, Copyrights, L.A.
TiMEs, Jan. 8, 1992, at A6.
153. Jim Mann, US. and China Avert Trade War over Copyrights, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1992, at D1.
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C. Thailand's Response to U.S. Actions
Thailand's initial response was also to resist the United States'
demands. 5 4 The United States reportedly demanded that Thailand
pass a revised copyright law by July 1991 and give patent protec-
tion to pharmaceuticals, including drugs awaiting patent registra-
tion in the United States, by October 1, 1991.15 5 The Thai
Commerce Ministry repeatedly refused to comply with the United
States' requests. 56 Thai Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun, told
the press that "the government still has seven months in which to
negotiate to avert possible [U.S.] retaliation which could result in
... raising import tariffs by up to 100 percent on some items."157
The United States is Thailand's largest export market.158 In July
1991, the Thai Foreign Minister, Arsa Sarasin, tried to persuade
then-U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, to have Thailand
dropped from the priority foreign country list due to its satisfactory
progress towards intellectual property protection. 59 Secretary
Baker acknowledged Thai efforts to improve intellectual property
protection, but urged Thailand to continue these efforts. 60
Thailand hoped that a successful conclusion to the Uruguay
Round of GATF would provide new international rules that would
ward off the Special 301 sanctions.161 The Thais complained partic-
ularly of the United States' double standards. Although the
United States was trying to force an immediate change in Thai-
land's intellectual property practices, the United States refused to
revise its own rice subsidy program until after the conclusion of the
154. The Prime Minister of Thailand was reported as having insisted that the Thai na-
tional interest must come first and be maintained during negotiations with the United
States. Thai P.M. on U.S. Threats of Trade Sanctions, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Apr. 28, 1991, No. 0428052. The Prime Minister's statement may have been in-
tended to avoid the political damage caused by any appearance of giving in to U.S. pres-
sure. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For a description of the Thai public's
resistance to changes in intellectual property laws, see O'Neill, supra note 84, at 619-23.
155. Thai P.M. on U.S. Threats of Trade Sanctions, supra note 154.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The United States purchases about one-fourth of Thailand's exports. Id.
159. XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, July 23, 1991, No. 0723170. "[A]rsa
briefed [B]aker on [T]hailand's attempt to strengthen its trade mark [sic] law, an amend-
ment [sic] version of which is now awaiting passage from the national legislative assembly,
to enforce stricter copyright protection and to strengthen the patent law." Id.
160. Id.
161. Peter Ungphakorn, Thailand 4; Pressure from US, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, Sur-
vey, at 34.
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Uruguay Round.162 Finally, on October 22, 1991, the Thai Cabinet
approved a draft bill to provide patent protection for pharmaceuti-
cals; 163 however, the details of a possible grace period to exempt
new drugs from protection temporarily was not finalized.
164
The Thai Government asked the United States to show "good
faith" by removing Thailand from the Special 301 list because it
was making progress on pharmaceutical patent reform. 165 Thai of-
ficials stated that the United States must understand that it was not
possible to meet all U.S. demands because the Thai Government
must also act in the best interests of Thailand. 166 There was consid-
erable opposition to pharmaceutical patents from local industry
and academic circles.167 The Thai Government emphasized that
pharmaceutical patents were not the same as other disputed intel-
lectual property matters, such as illicitly copied videos: "Copied
drugs are not sold on street-side stalls in tourist haunts.... They
are legally approved by the Thai Food and Drug Administra-
tion."' 68 The remaining disagreements between Thailand and the
United States concerned (1) a possible grace period before the law
went into effect, (2) criteria for compulsory licenses, and (3) transi-
tional protection for drugs already patented but not yet sold in
other countries.169
On February 27, 1992, the Thai Assembly passed the draft bill,
thus extending patent coverage to pharmaceuticals, food, drinks,
biotechnology, and agricultural machinery. 170 The law did not con-
tain the four-year grace period that Thai critics had desired. 171 The
law, however, did grant the Thai Government some power over
162. Id.
163. Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Draft Approved, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 23,
1991.
164. Id.
165. Thailand Asks U.S. To "Show Good Faith" in Trade Ties, XINHUA GEN. OVER-
SEAS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 1991, No. 1118045. "[T]he patent act amendment passed its
first reading last week in the [N]ational [A]ssembly, which decided to set up a 19-member
committee to further consider it." Id.
166. Id.
167. See Thai Pharmaceutical Patent Draft Approved, supra note 163. The critics of
patent protection demanded a four-year grace period so that domestic pharmaceutical
companies could adjust to royalties. Id.
168. Ungphakorn, supra note 161, at 34.
169. Id.
170. Ungphakorn, supra note 22, at 3.
171. Id.
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abuse of patent rights.1 72 Although the USTR was due to make a
final decision on Thai patent practice in mid-March,' 73 Thai offi-
cials insisted that the revision to the Act was not a response to
trade threats but was designed to comply with proposed intellec-
tual property rules for the GATT Uruguay Round.174
The new law175 is not yet available in an official English trans-
lation. The USTR, however, has provided an unofficial, prelimi-
nary translation produced by the United States Embassy in
Bangkok.' 76 Section 9 of the 1979 Act,x77 which prohibited the pat-
enting of foods, medicines, and agricultural machinery, has been
repealed and replaced.178  The prohibition on patenting
pharmaceuticals has been deleted, but it is not clear whether bio-
technology patents will be allowed.' 79 Furthermore, a broad, new
exception for inventions that affect the public health or welfare
could be used to deny patents to pharmaceuticals.' 80 In keeping
with suggestions from the United States, the patent term has been
extended from fifteen to twenty years.' 8 ' Process patents now re-
ceive full protection: "the right to produce, use, sell, keep for sale,
offer for sale, or import to the Kingdom the produce produced by
patented process."' 8 2 Nevertheless, an exception for "preparations




175. Patent Act B.E. 2535, Feb. 27, 1992.
176. Informal Translation of New Patent Act, BANGKOK 09964 (telegram from the
USTR, copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal)
[hereinafter New Patent Act].
177. For the text of Thai Patent Act § 9, see supra note 24.
178. New Patent Act, supra note 176, § 4.
The protection under this act shall not cover the following: (1) Microorganism
and any other part of microorganism which can be found naturally, or in animals,
plants or the extract from animals or plants; (2) A scientific or mathematical rule
of theory; (3) A computer program; (4) Methods to analyze, treat or cure the
diseases in human beings or animals; (5) An invention which would be contrary to




181. Id. § 10.
182. Id. § 12.
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treatment"'8 3  may provide a limited loophole for some
pharmaceuticals.'84
The compulsory license provisions 8 5 have also been revised.
Applicants for a compulsory license must now prove that they have
attempted to obtain a license from the patentee by "proposing ap-
propriate condition and compensation but not being able to agree
in an appropriate period of time." 186 This places a larger burden
on the party seeking a compulsory license. In addition, the Direc-
tor-General can now initiate the compulsory licensing process after
giving the patentee notice and an opportunity to be heard.187 Sec-
tion 51 of the 1979 Act has been modified to allow the Thai Gov-
ernment to appropriate patents to prevent or alleviate "serious
shortages of food or medical supplies or for other public services,"
but the government must pay a reasonable royalty to the patentee
for the appropriation.18s Section 55,189 on revocation of patents,
has been ameliorated. Patents can now be revoked only when
compulsory licensing has been inadequate or when the patents
have been used in a prohibited, anti-competitive manner.19° Fi-
nally, a Board of Pharmaceutical Patents has been created. 191 The
Board's function is to monitor pricing and availability of patented
pharmaceuticals and, if necessary, to initiate the compulsory licens-
ing process. 192
D. Possible Long-Term Consequences of U.S. Actions
The United States' effort to force unilaterally a change in
Thailand's pharmaceutical patent policy appears to have suc-
183. Id.
184. Some profitable pharmaceuticals are protected only by process patents; the drugs
themselves have been known for a long time and are no longer protected by product pat-
ents. Nonetheless, the current process, which allows the pharmaceutical corporation to
manufacture the drug profitably, may be protected by a process patent. Although process
patents are notoriously difficult to enforce because one must prove which process was used
to manufacture the purportedly infringing product, companies may attempt to defend a
particularly lucrative process. The Thai law seems to remove any process protection by
exempting at least some processes from patent protection where the processes are used to
manufacture a prescription drug.
185. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
186. New Patent Act, supra note 176, § 17.
187. Id. § 18.
188. Id. § 24.
189. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
190. New Patent Act, supra note 176, § 26.
191. Id. § 27.
192. Id.
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ceeded. Pharmaceuticals have been granted patent protection,
although the protection may not be complete. U.S. intellectual
property owners requested changes to the Thai compulsory license
provisions. There have been changes, but those changes may not
be adequate. Finally, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry demanded
transitional protection for drugs that have been patented in the
United States but are not yet commercially available.193 The re-
vised law does not address this matter, but this protection may be
available under the Ministerial Regulations allowed under the
Act.194
Despite the apparent U.S. victory, the United States as well as
Thai interests may be damaged in the long-term. First, there may
be few, if any, economic gains for U.S. corporations. If the Thai
economy is unable to afford increased drug prices, or if the in-
creased prices are simply passed back to the United States as
higher prices on Thai goods, there will be no net gain for the
United States. If the pharmaceuticals affected are so essential that
price increases in the drugs divert needed funds from vital develop-
ment projects, 195 the entire rate of growth of the rapidly developing
Thai economy could be hindered.196 In that situation, overall trade
with the United States would decrease. Second, such action will
almost certainly lead to a cooling relationship between the two
countries. The United States has expended considerable efforts
and funds, through U.S.A.I.D.97 and other programs, to foster a
relationship with Thailand. Long-term U.S. trade policy has been
constructed around multilateral negotiation. 198 Attaining U.S.
trade goals by threat of trade retaliation undermines these policies.
193. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
194. Telephone interview with Peter Collins, United States Trade Representative (Mar.
5, 1992).
195. The economic future of Thailand is currently clouded by serious deficiencies in the
infrastructure of the country. Plans have been formulated to deal with many of these
problems, but recent lack of political stability has already jeopardized many of these plans.
See Reshuffle of Thai Cabinet Shifts Political Support of Infrastructural Plans, Bus. ASIA,
Feb. 4, 1991, at 40. Additional pressures on the economy caused by increased healthcare
costs might further impede these important projects.
196. See Champon, supra note 67, at 278-80; O'Neill, supra note 84, at 603-05.
197. See supra note 71.
198. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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V. A NEW THEORY: LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO
BENEFITS OF PATENT PROTECTION
A. General Relationship Between Patent Benefits and Level of
Economic Development
Although a number of studies have questioned whether it is
beneficial for developing countries to adopt Western-type systems
for intellectual property protection, many developing countries
have adopted such systems.199 This choice probably has been moti-
vated by a belief in the predicted benefits of an intellectual prop-
erty system, as well as a belief that having an intellectual property
system reflects a certain level of status.2°° Now, the threats of trade
retaliation employed by the United States are providing additional
reasons for Third World countries to adopt an intellectual property
system.201 Yet, adopting an intellectual property system, either by
free choice or under compulsion, does not mean necessarily that
the the adoption of the system is in the country's best interest. The
level of a country's development alters the cost-benefit ratio of
granting patents. As a country develops, it will pass through a
number of stages, each of which presents a different cost-benefit
picture for the granting of patents. Several authors have suggested
different versions of a model of economic evolution. 2°2 The follow-
ing scenario is a summary of their views.
The first stage is that of a country at a very low level of eco-
nomic development. A completely under-developed country has
little technological capacity and infrastructure, and will make few,
if any, internationally patentable inventions. Such a country would
not benefit from a patent system because, as an under-developed
country, it would not be limited by a shortage of inventions but by
the ability to utilize readily available technology. Whereas the
economy of a developed country depends on new inventions, an
under-developed country needs to expand its economy by imple-
menting older inventions that are already available in the public
domain.203
199. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 865-66.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
202. See Emmert, supra note 7, at 1380; Oddi, supra note 12, at 857; O'Neill, supra note
84, at 624-26.
203. For example, an undeveloped country probably needs to build regular railroads
and expand its economic infrastructure before it can benefit from patented technology,
such as a high-speed, automatic train. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 843.
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As the country's economy develops, markets and the infra-
structure necessary for innovation will also develop, and the coun-
try will reach the second stage. The country becomes capable of
using more advanced technology and may become an intellectual
property pirate. Such a country is often rapidly developing and
fuels the growth of its economy through intellectual property theft.
Eventually, a country will reach the third stage of develop-
ment, where its businesses can create world-class inventions. At
that point, it becomes profitable for the country to grant patent
protection so as to protect its own innovators. Profits from piracy
of international intellectual property are outweighed by losses to
the country and its inventors caused by failure to protect their own
inventions. Because international intellectual property protection
is on a quid pro quo basis, the country must provide strong patent
protection so that other advanced countries will reciprocate and
respect its patents. WICs, including the United States, reached this
third stage over a century ago. Many of the difficulties with inter-
national intellectual property protection may be caused by a failure
of WICs to recognize the evolutionary stages of patent protection.
At least one study presents empirical evidence that can be
used to support the model of an evolutionary pathway in the devel-
opment of intellectual property protection.2° 4 J. Davidson Frame
gathered data on twelve variables related to economic, technologi-
cal, and scientific capabilities of 128 countries.205 The goal of the
study was to determine which economic factors, if any, correlated
with countries that are intellectual property pirates. The study
used three published reports to identify the worst intellectual prop-
erty pirate countries, "first-tier LOWCOMM countries" identified
by all three reports.206 An additional group of eight "second-tier
LOWCOMM" countries were identified by only two of the three
reports.20 7 Frame found that the listed countries, particularly those
in the first-tier, had larger populations, economies, and scientific
and technological capacities than other Third World countries.2°8
204. J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An
Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209 (1987).
205. Id. at 209-10.
206. Id. at 212. The eight countries were Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, the
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Tarkey. Id.
207. Id. These countries were Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Pakistan, Peru, Sin-
gapore, and Thailand. Id.
208. Id. at 215-16.
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In addition, he found that the pirate countries patented more heav-
ily in the United States than do other Third World countries. This
was taken as evidence of a developing economy and "the emer-
gence of nascent world-class technological capabilities" in the pi-
rating countries. 209 Frame concluded that the pirating countries
stood "at the threshold of the ranks of the industrialized coun-
tries." 210 Finally, Frame developed a mathematical model that
demonstrated that the three variables (scientific articles published,
gross national product, and number of U.S. patents acquired) were
the best predictors of the technological capacity and developmen-
tal stage of a country. 211 He concluded that the technological
strength of the pirate countries indicated that all these countries
should adopt intellectual property protection to ensure continued
development.212
These same observations, however, can be interpreted in a dif-
ferent way. First, pirating intellectual property has produced
strong, growing economies. This supports the idea that countries at
a certain level of development (the second stage) benefit greatly
from pirating. Second, there is a wide range in the economic status
of the pirate countries.21 3 Third, only the richest, most developed
of the pirate countries (Korea and Taiwan) have been successfully
"persuaded" to strengthen their intellectual property laws.214
In other words, intellectual property pirating fuels develop-
ment until the country reaches the point where intellectual prop-
erty protection becomes economically advantageous. At that point
in the development, represented by the transition from stage two
to stage three in the model, an intellectual property system either
develops or can be imposed successfully from the outside. This
supports the interpretation that a country naturally adopts a com-
prehensive system of intellectual property protection only when it
reaches an adequate level of development. Attempts to force a
country to adopt an intellectual property scheme will be successful
only if the country is sufficiently developed to benefit from the
scheme. If the country has not reached this point, the costs of in-
209. Id. at 217.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 218-23.
212. Id. at 224.
213. Id. at 225-27 (app.).
214. Id. at 216.
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tellectual property protection will outweigh its benefits, and the
protection scheme, if adopted, will be enforced only sporadically.
This interpretation could explain the results of the Pharmaceu-
tical Manufacturers Association's efforts to promote worldwide
patent protection for pharmaceuticals. 215 Korea, Taiwan, and Can-
ada have recently amended their patent laws to give improved pro-
tection to pharmaceuticals. 216 The gross national product per
capita, the number of scientific publications, the number of domes-
tic patents, and the number of U.S. patents for these countries are
quite high.217 These factors are consistent with the notion that
these countries have already reached stage three of development.
The success of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association's ef-
forts could indicate that these countries were simply ready to adopt
pharmaceutical patent protection. An analysis of these same fac-
tors also suggests that Thailand ranks below the average of the pi-
rate countries on most indicators of development. 218 This would
mean that, while the Thai economy is expanding rapidly, it has not
yet reached stage three. It may be useless, or even counter-produc-
tive, to try to force a complete intellectual property system on a
country before the country is adequately developed. It is too early
to determine whether the system of pharmaceutical patent protec-
tion that the United States has forced on Thailand will be
successful.
215. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 316.
216. Id
217. See Frame, supra note 204, at 225-27. The following data are taken from that
source:
Domestic
GNP $ Scientific Patent
Country per capita Publications Application U.S. Patents
Canada $17,723 17,218 25,707 3,548
South Korea $1,919 389 6,394 94
Taiwan $3,061 622 n/a 338
Id.
218. Id. at 213, tbl. 1, 226. The following data are derived from that source:
Domestic
Region or Population GNP $ GNP $ Scientific Patent
Country (Millions) (Billions) per capita Publications Applications U.S. Patents
lst-Tier LOWCOMM
(average) 74.4 109.63 1,682 634 3,449 86
Thailand 52.80 52.40 992 218 563 4
Id.
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B. Proposed Alternatives to Current U.S. Practices219
If strengthening intellectual property protection harms rather
than benefits developing countries, the wisdom of the U.S. policy is
questionable. A mechanism should be created that will protect a
developing country from economic damage and promote develop-
ment until that country reaches the stage at which it is profitable
for the country to strengthen its intellectual property laws. One
possible solution is to use economic incentives to alleviate potential
damage.
There are three reasons why WICs should grant incentives to
the least developed nations. First, unrestricted aid is necessary to
develop the infrastructure of these countries so that the economy
can improve to the point where protection of intellectual property
is beneficial. Much of the current U.S. foreign aid to under-devel-
oped countries is granted with this goal in mind.220 Second, incen-
tive aid should be aimed specifically at reducing the costs of the
imposed intellectual property systems. Because, initially at least,
WICs would be the major benefactors221 of the intellectual prop-
erty system, they should help to defray the costs. Fortunately, the
costs of operating a patent system in the poorest countries would
be low; these countries represent such poor markets that the
United States and other WICs do not bother to protect most of
their intellectual property there. Thus, the volume of patents (and,
therefore, the administrative costs of the system) will be low.
Third, aid is needed to overcome the damage to developing econo-
mies caused by the increased costs of protected technologies-par-
ticularly those involving food production or healthcare.
219. Many authors have recognized that direct imposition of a Western-style
intellectual property system can work great hardship on a developing nation. The
alternatives presented are a synthesis and reworking of many of these plans. Therefore, it
is difficult to attribute any one part of the proposal to a particular author. An interested
reader should consult the following sources and the references therein: Emmert, supra
note 7, at 1379-99; Oddi, supra note 12, at 865-77; O'Neill, supra note 84, at 623-26;
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: Supranational Authority Vs.
National Extraterritorial Antitrust-A Plea for "Harmonized" Regionalism, 82 MIcH. L.
Ruv. 1489, 1505-09 (1984). See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 106, at 301-07; Gregory J.
Koebel, Comment, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Singapore and Thailand: A
Comparative Analysis, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 329-39 (1987).
220. For an excellent treatment of U.S. foreign aid goals in Thailand, see generally
MUSCAT, supra note 73.
221. Even after a developing country has reached the third stage of development, the
number of inventions patented by its citizens will be much smaller than the number of
inventions patented by citizens from WICs.
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One question is whether the incentives for introducing a West-
ern-style intellectual property system should be given to all coun-
tries or only to countries above a developmental threshold. In
other words, should the countries be ignored until they reach the
stage-two to stage-three transition or should the incentives to im-
plement an intellectual property system be introduced even in
stage-one countries? A uniform policy of encouraging all countries
to adopt intellectual property protection is probably preferable. It
should be easier to encourage a developing country to adopt an
intellectual property system before it reaches the "pirating" stage
of economic development. Once a country has developed a signifi-
cant number of businesses that profit from pirating, these busi-
nesses will become a political force that will oppose the adoption of
intellectual property regulations.222 In addition, the United States
might find it extremely difficult to determine when a country had
reached the proper developmental stage for the imposition of an
intellectual property system.223 It would be simpler to encourage
an intellectual property system in all countries regardless of devel-
opmental stage. In any case, the incentives should continue until
the country has reached a level of development where benefits of
intellectual property protection clearly outweigh its costs. 224
Deciding when to end the incentives would also be difficult.
Employing economic indicators should provide a rational basis for
such a choice, however. 225 The incentive aid will ensure that intel-
lectual property protection does not increase the overall cost of
vital technologies to developing economies and, thus, impede de-
222. An example is the vocal opposition to the granting of pharmaceutical patents in
Thailand. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
223. The present system under Special 301 achieves the same results as a system
designed to impose intellectual property protection when a country has reached the "pirat-
ing" stage of economic development. This is the stage where, arguably, their activity be-
gins to harm U.S. concerns. It is likely, however, that an intellectual property system will
not be advantageous for many countries at this stage. By ignoring countries before they
reach the "pirating" stage, the present system selects the "level of development" approach
by default.
224. Some authors have suggested the use of an incentive system, but have emphasized
that the incentives must be strictly limited in time so that the developing countries will be
encouraged to progress quickly to true intellectual property protection. See Kastenmeier
& Beier, supra note 106, at 304. The problem with setting time limits to the incentives is
that real hardships will ensue if incentives are terminated before real benefits outweigh the
costs of the imposed intellectual property system.
225. For an explanation of economic models that could be used to determine when the
technological capacity of a country has increased sufficiently to benefit from intellectual
property protection, see supra notes 199-217 and accompanying text.
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velopment. Eventually, the economic benefits of intellectual prop-
erty should overwhelm its costs, and further incentive aid will be
unnecessary.
The form that the incentive aid should take must still be
decided. Certainly, foreign aid payments to fund-development
projects should continue. Direct aid payments should also be made
to defer the operational expenses of fledgling patent systems until
they can be supported by user fees. The problems surrounding the
payment of royalties on pharmaceuticals and similar health/food
items are more troubling. There are two competing goals. On one
hand, it is in the interest of the United States to stimulate the econ-
omies of developing nations and to ensure their welfare. Not only
would vigorous economies in the Third World provide a market for
U.S. products, but peace and prosperity in the Third World would
allow the United States to reduce its own internal military expendi-
tures. On the other hand, the U.S. Government is also under con-
siderable political pressure to guarantee the profitability of U.S.
pharmaceutical companies by allowing them to collect royalties on
the international use of their patents. Perhaps, this second goal is
now less cogent than it was during the Reagan and Bush Adminis-
trations, considering the Clinton Administration's efforts to lower
the domestic costs of pharmaceuticals.
226
Nevertheless, both goals could be met by making
pharmaceuticals available to developing nations without royalty
costs and having the U.S. Government rebate to the manufacturers
a royalty payment based on the number of units shipped. Alterna-
tively, the United States could allow its pharmaceutical companies
to collect its foreign royalties, but then rebate the royalties as for-
eign aid to the lesser-developed countries. The drawback of this
latter approach is that drug prices might increase unconscionably,
and there is no guarantee that the foreign governments would
share the rebates with their poorest citizens. It should be
remembered that if the power of the United States is used to fur-
ther retaliatory trade policies that force protection of pharmaceuti-
cal patents, the U.S. Government will effectively be subsidizing the
pharmaceutical industry anyway. One unfortunate aspect of such
policies is that the rest of the United States' foreign trade must
226. It seems inconsistent to insist that foreign consumers should pay U.S. pharmaceu-
tical companies more and, at the same time, insist that domestic consumers should pay
them less.
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bear the costs of the subsidy when the retaliatory tariff costs are
passed on as higher prices on exports from developing countries.
Nevertheless, this is the approach sanctioned by the current stat-
utes.227 Once the royalty costs are covered by a subsidy, it might
become economically viable for U.S. companies to undertake phar-
maceutical production in the foreign country. In this way, the
promised benefits of an intellectual property system would be ob-
tained more rapidly.
The key to the subsidy system would be to end (perhaps grad-
ually) the subsidy once the country reaches an adequate level of
economic development. 228 It is also possible for the exact criteria
for ending the subsidy to be negotiated on a country-by-country
basis. It is highly unlikely that a country could (or would want to)
retard economic development artificially, simply to keep receiving
a subsidy on pharmaceuticals. Thus, the goal of worldwide intellec-
tual property protection could be achieved while ensuring the de-
veloping countries that such a system would necessarily be to their
benefit.
C. The Situation in Thailand
The United States seems to have succeeded in forcing Thai-
land to change its patent laws to permit protection of pharmaceuti-
cals. 229 It remains to be seen, however, whether Thailand will
rigorously enforce the new law. The proposed economic model
predicts that, if the Thai economy is sufficiently developed, phar-
maceutical patents will prove beneficial. Otherwise, the new pat-
ent policy will damage Thailand's economic development and will
probably not be enforced rigorously. United States policy should
be based on a rational assessment of both a country's level of de-
velopment and the long-term costs of an imposed intellectual prop-
erty system, and not on bullying threats designed to maximize the
short-term profits of U.S. corporations.
Most countries are unwilling to give up control over vital in-
ternal functions, such as healthcare or food production.230 Thus,
Thailand, a country that already lacks sufficient funds for necessary
227. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
228. The phase-out of subsidy could be based on key economic factors, such as individ-
ual yearly income, gross national product, and filings for U.S. patents by that country's
nationals. See supra notes 199-217 and accompanying text.
229. See supra part IV.C.
230. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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development, will naturally resist policies that cause drug costs to
escalate. It is unrealistic to claim that the piracy of patented drugs
by Thailand or other developing countries will discourage the de-
velopment of new drugs in the United States. The risk-benefit
analyses that lead companies to fund the development of currently
patented pharmaceuticals were made with full knowledge of the
fact that many countries do not recognize patents on pharmaceuti-
cals. Thus, consumers in WICs covered the cost without expecting
any contributions from the Third World. If Thailand and other
countries pay royalties, the pharmaceutical companies will receive
a windfall.2 3' It is also unrealistic to expect Thailand to make a
prospective contribution232 by promising to honor the patents of
future pharmaceuticals, unless those drugs are designed to meet
the needs of Thailand.
The current confrontation with Thailand provides an ideal op-
portunity for the United States to test and perfect the incentive
system described above. Thailand is not yet as developed as coun-
tries that have recently been successful in switching over to a U.S.-
style intellectual property system.23 3 Rather, it is in an intermedi-
ate position of development.234 Even before the recent U.S. pres-
sure, Thailand's patent laws provided protection for most forms of
technology.2 35 Thus, Thailand was already moving towards the
type of intellectual property system favored by the United States.
Thailand was probably willing to grant protection to most inven-
tions because the Thai Government had already determined that it
was to Thailand's advantage to compete directly in those areas of
technology. Only in pharmaceuticals and agriculture did the Thai
Government restrict patent protection.236 Rather than alienating
an ally through threats of trade retaliation, the U.S. Government
should apply the suggested incentive system to help Thailand move
all the way to a Western-style intellectual property system.
231. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 845-45.
232. That is, a system that enforces the intellectual property rights to future
pharmaceuticals on the grounds that such a system would equitably share the development
costs of those drugs.
233. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 310.
234. For a comparison of some facets of Thailand's economy with other intellectual
property pirating countries, see Frame, supra note 204. The cited reference contains con-
siderably more data in an appendix. Id. at 225-27.
235. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
236. Id.
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The United States' response to Thailand's failure to respect
pharmaceutical patents should be consistent with its overall policy
to further the United States' international trade goals. The likeli-
hood that countries must reach a critical developmental level to
make protecting intellectual property rights profitable, coupled
with the direct economic costs of an intellectual property system,
suggest that an incentive program may be the best way to en-
courage respect for U.S. intellectual property rights.237 Incentives
could help pay for the needed infrastructure and reduce the time
necessary for a given country to develop to the point of voluntarily
protecting intellectual property. On the other hand, trade retalia-
tion and premature adoption of intellectual property protection
can damage developing economies and will only delay further de-
velopment of these countries to a level where intellectual property
protection becomes beneficial.
The Thais should be given a guarantee that they will receive
U.S. pharmaceutical and agricultural inventions without royalty
costs if Thailand provides the enhanced patent protection that the
United States desires. The United States and Thailand should
enter into an agreement to continue this intellectual property roy-
alty subsidy until Thailand reaches a predetermined level of eco-
nomic development. Thus, both countries will be working toward
the improvement of the Thai economy, and U.S. companies will
benefit from the increased market provided by an improved Thai
economy. This will provide a powerful example as other develop-
ing nations see the significant advantage to protecting U.S. intellec-
tual property rights.
D. Summary of Evolutionary Model of Intellectual
Property Development
A nation should base its decision to protect intellectual prop-
erty on a cost-benefit analysis. A balance that favors intellectual
property laws in WICs does not necessarily apply to developing
nations.238 There is empirical evidence that the internal level of
creation of patentable inventions and the level of development in a
country correlate with the degree to which a country respects or
237. See supra part V.B.
238. See supra part III.B.
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violates intellectual property rights.239 These data suggest a natural
progression towards intellectual property protection.240
In stage one, the economic development of an extremely
under-developed country is indifferent to intellectual property pro-
tection. The protection of intellectual property will result neither
in the use of advanced technology nor in a flow of technology-re-
lated capital into the country. Under-developed countries often
adopt intellectual property protection systems even though the sys-
tems may provide no obvious benefits. 241 More advanced coun-
tries, those in stage two, have sufficiently developed economies and
the necessary infrastructure to profit from modem technology.
These countries become the greatest pirates of intellectual prop-
erty because they can profit from the intellectual property, but are
not yet in a position to benefit from the protection of intellectual
property. 242 Eventually, a country reaches stage three, where its
economy develops to a point that it begins to create valuable intel-
lectual property. At this time, there will be more long-term value
to their economy from protection of the indigenous intellectual
property than from continued piracy of foreign intellectual
property.
To protect its indigenous intellectual property and to have
other countries respect those rights, a sufficiently developed coun-
try, one in stage three, will establish intellectual property laws that
harmonize with international standards. A natural progression of
economic development makes it useless to force premature adop-
tion of intellectual property laws. Yet, subtle pressure may be ef-
fective in getting adequately-developed countries to change over to
a Western-style intellectual property system. Supporters of U.S. in-
tellectual property rights have cited several recent instances where
pressure has forced pirating countries to adopt laws giving en-
hanced intellectual property protection.2 43 These countries proba-
bly adopted strict intellectual property laws not only because of
threats of trade retaliation, but also because their economies had
239. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
240. See supra part V.A.
241. See Oddi, supra note 12, at 852.
242. In other words, their economies are not sufficiently developed to create intellec-
tual property worthy of protection. Unless the intellectual property owners are able to
impose truly draconian penalties for the piracy, the cost-benefit balance will continue to
favor the theft of intellectual property.
243. See Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 310.
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attained the level of development at which intellectual property
protection becomes beneficial. On the other hand, retaliatory
trade policies might damage the rate of development of a stage-two
country and actually delay the adoption of an effective intellectual
property system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the factors that favor intellec-
tual property systems in WICs, such as the United States, are re-
lated to the economic status of the countries. Rich, well-developed
economies benefit from intellectual property protection, while
poor, under-developed economies do not. Given proper circum-
stances, countries progress from an undeveloped state where they
are indifferent to intellectual property, through an intermediate
state where they benefit economically from the piracy of intellec-
tual property, to a more economically-developed state where they
benefit from intellectual property protection.
The goal of the United States in international trade should be
to increase the benefits to its own economy. This can be attained
by maximizing the volume of foreign trade and by maximizing the
royalties U.S. citizens receive from the international use of their
intellectual property. This means that developing countries must
be aided in their progression towards a stage-three economy that
respects intellectual property.
Retaliatory trade policies and other efforts to coerce the pre-
mature adoption of intellectual property protection can damage
developing economies and run counter to overall U.S. goals. This
is especially true where the intellectual property in question is
pharmaceutical patents. Forcing a developing country to honor
pharmaceutical patents prematurely could directly damage the
health of the country's citizens as well as its economy.
Thailand appears to be on the border between a stage-two and
a stage-three economy. If its economy is sufficiently developed, it
may be able to adapt successfully to the pharmaceutical patent pol-
icy that the United States has forced upon it. If its economy is not
sufficiently developed, the imposed patent policy will merely slow
its economic development to the detriment of both Thailand and
the United States. A balanced policy of incentives as suggested in
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this Comment is a more certain and equitable method of ensuring
Thailand's recognition of U.S. pharmaceutical patents.
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